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Abstract. The dynamic establishment of shared information (e.g. se-
cret key) between two entities is particularly important in networks with
no pre-determined structure such as wireless sensor networks (and in
general wireless mobile ad-hoc networks). In such networks, nodes es-
tablish and terminate communication sessions dynamically with other
nodes which may have never been encountered before, in order to some-
how exchange information which will enable them to subsequently com-
municate in a secure manner. In this paper we give and theoretically
analyze a series of protocols that enables two entities that have never
encountered each other before to establish a shared piece of information
for use as a key in setting up a secure communication session with the
aid of a shared key encryption algorithm. These protocols do not require
previous pre-distribution of candidate keys or some other piece of infor-
mation of specialized form except a small seed value, from which the two
entities can produce arbitrarily long strings with many similarities.
1 Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have some constraints, with regard to
battery life, processing, memory and commnication ([3]) capacity, and
as such are deemed unsuitable for public crypto-based systems. Thus,
symmetric key cryptosystems are more appropriate for these types of
networks, but lead to problems with key distribution. These problems are
mitigated with key pre-distribution schemes, in which candidate keys are
distributed to members of the network before the start communication.
Many innovative and intuitive key pre-distribution schemes for WSNs
have been proposed for solving the problem of key distribution in sen-
sor networks. On the two ends of the spectrum are key pre-distribution
schemes that use a single master key as the encryption key distributed
amongst all the nodes, and all pairwise keys, where a unique key exists
for every pair of sensors. The former provides the most efficient usage
of memory and scales well, but an attack on one node compromises the
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whole network, whereas the latter provides excellent resilience but does
not scale well. In addition, schemes exist which are in essence proba-
bilistic, relying on the fact that any two neighbouring nodes have some
probability p of successfully completing key establishment. Some such
schemes are presented in the sequel, but the list is by no means exhaus-
tive. The authors of [10] propose a key distribution scheme which con-
sists of three phases. In the first phase, namely the key pre-distribution
phase, k random keys are drawn from a generated pool of P keys, and are
preloaded onto the sensor nodes before their deployment. These k keys
constitute the key ring of each sensor node. The key identifiers of the key
rings are loaded onto controller nodes, along with the identifiers of the
corresponding nodes and the keys shared between the controller nodes
and the sensor nodes. Once the nodes are deployed, the second phase
takes place, the shared-key discovery phase, which allows nodes to dis-
cover their neighbours within communication range and with which they
share keys. This phase establishes the topology of the sensor network,
as seen by the routing layer. The third, and final phase, is the path-key
establishment phase which assigns a path-key to pairs of sensor nodes in
wireless communication range that do not share a common key. The au-
thors of [4] present an alternative to this scheme, the q-composite random
key predistribution scheme, whereby instead of one single common key to
be shared between two nodes, q keys are required, resulting in strength-
ened securty under small scale attacks, trading off increased vulnerability
on large scale attacks. The authors also propose the establishment of
the key-path along multiple paths, and a random-pairwaise keys scheme
which provides, amongst others, node-to-node authentication. The au-
thors of [5] also take the scheme of [10] and modify it by taking into
consideration that different locations of nodes require different security
needs, and as such propose a subgrouping approach in order to isolate any
node captures that might take place in specific subgroups. The scheme
also provides scalability for key pre-distribution, by taking into account
the probability of node compromise for each of the subgroups. Chan and
Perrig ([6]) address the lack of scalability of existing symmetric-key key
distribution protocols, and increase the security against node compro-
mise. In their proposed PIKE protoccol, sensor nodes are used as trusted
intermediaries to establish shared keys between nodes in the wireless sen-
sor network. The authors of [8] propose a pair-wise key pre-distribution
scheme, which is based on the scheme proposed by [1]. Their work in-
volves the the pre-loading of crypto shares from multiple key spaces onto
each sensor node, and after deployment, two nodes may establish a shared
key between them only if they contain crypto shares from the same key
space, leading to an improvement in scalability. Finally, the same au-
thors ([9]) propose a scheme which utilises deployment knowledge, and
generates pairwise keys between nodes and their neighbours, guarantee-
ing that each node can establish a secure communications link with its
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neighbours post deployment, with a high probability. The previous solu-
tions all pre-suppose that the sensor nodes have been loaded with some
pre-existing information (i.e. the key, or sets of keys) prior to network de-
ployment, except for Liu and Cheng ([11]). They propose a self-configured
scheme whereby no prior knowledge is loaded onto the sensor nodes, but
shared keys are computed amongst the neighbours. The authors propose
SBK which is also a topology adaptive scheme, achieves high connectivity
with a small storage overhead, and iSBK, and improved version of SBK.
In this paper, we propose a key agreement scheme whereby network
nodes are not pre-loaded with candidate keys, but generate pairs of sym-
metric keys from two, initially, random bits strings. The initial research
conducted ([12]) proposed a protocol that involved the examination of
random positions of subsets of size k, and the elimination of a random
position if the two bit strings were found to disagree on more than half
the examined positions. In that paper, however, the nodes cannot secretly
compute the number of differing positions, a problem that is resolved
in the present paper using secret circuit computations. In addition, the
present protocols do not eliminate differing bits but flips them, depend-
ing on the number of bit difference in the examined subset of k bits. This
leads to a different stochastic process that called for a different theoret-
ical analysis. The scheme we propose has the following four properties:
(i) scalability, since new nodes may enter the network whenever they
desire without the need to equip them with some suitable key set (ii)
connectivity, since any two nodes of the network can reach a large degree
of similarities on the strings the possess (iii) no storage overhead, since
the string sizes are independent on the network size and (iv) resilience
against node captures, since capturing any number of nodes of the net-
work does not affect the strings other nodes possess. On the negative
side, the protocol we give have some increased communication overhead.
However, once two nodes reach a position where their two strings have
sufficiently much similarity, they can create from them a large number of
candidate keys (possibly using error correction techniques to create even
more similarities) for their current and future communication needs.
2 The bit-similarity problem
Two entities, say 0 and 1, initially possess an N -bit string, X0N and X
1
N
respectively. The entities’ goal is to cooperatively transform their strings
so as to increase the percentage of positions at which their strings contain
the same bits, which we denote by X(i), with i being the time step of the
protocol they execute. ThenX(0) is the initial percentage of the positions
at which the two strings are the same.
Below we provide a randomized protocol in which the two entities
examine randomly chosen subsets of their strings in order to see whether
they differ in at least half of the places. If they do, one of the entities (in
turn) randomly flips a subset of these positions. This process continues
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up to a certain, predetermined number of steps. The intuition behind
this protocol is that when two random substrings of two strings differ in
at least half of their positions, then flipping some bits at random in one
of the substrings is more likely to increase the percentage of similarities
between the strings than to decrease it. In the description of the protocol
XcN [S] denotes a substring of string X
c
N defined by the position set S.
Protocol for user Uc, c = 0, 1
Protocol parameters known to both communicating parties: (i) k, l, the subset sizes,
(ii) T , the number of protocol execution steps, (iii) the index (bit position) set N , (iv)
The circuit C with which the two entities jointly compute whether there are at least
⌈k/2⌉ similarities between randomly chosen subsets of their strings.
1. i ← 1 /* The step counter. */
2. while i ≤ T /* T is a predetermined time step limit (discussed in Section 5).*/
3. begin /* while */
4. S ← JOINT RAND(k, {1, . . . , N}) /* Shared random set of k positions. See
text. */
5. same pos ← C(XcN [S], X
(c+1 mod 2)
N
[S]) /* A secret computation of number of
positions with same contents (see Section 3). */
6. if (same pos ≥ ⌈ k
2
⌉ and odd(i+ c)) then /* Users 0 and 1 alternate. */
7. begin
8. SF ← RAND(l, S) /* Random set of l positions from within S to be flipped
by the user whose turn it is to flip. */
9. flip the bits of XcN [SF ]
10. end
11. SYNCHRONIZE /* Users 0 and 1 wait to reach this point simultaneously
(barrier synchronization). */
12. i ← i+ 1
13. end /* while */
An important requirement of the protocol is the existence of a random
number generator at each party which produces the same values, started
from a (small) seed value shared by both parties. This is in order to
allow the two parties to avoid sending over the communication channel
the chosen substring positions, as they are generated in synchrony by the
two parties (see Line 4 of the protocol).
With regard to the protocol, we are interested in the evolution of the
random variable X(i), i.e. the percentage of the positions of X0N and X
1
N
at which they are the same, after the ith step of the protocol.
3 Secret two-party function computation
During the execution of the protocol, it is necessary for the two commu-
nicating parties to see whether they agree on at least half of the positions
they have chosen to compare (line 13-14 of the protocol). Thus, the two
parties need to perform a computation: compute the number of positions
on which the corresponding bits in the two chosen subsets of k bits are
the same. This is an instance of an important, general problem in cryp-
tography: Secure Computation.
Secure computation techniques allow two (or more) communicating
parties to compute a function on their inputs so that nothing is revealed to
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each party except what can be inferred from own input and the computed
value. Moreover, no information is revealed about the bit values to a party
not involved in the computation (e.g. eavesdropper).
More formally, let A and B be two parties with inputs of nA and
nB bits respectively. The objective is to jointly compute a function f :
{0, 1}nA × {0, 1}nB → {0, 1} on their inputs. The issue, here, is that A
and B cannot, simply, exchange their inputs and compute the function
since they will learn each other’s inputs, something that is not desirable
in a secure computation setting. More importantly, even it A and B are
willing to share their inputs, they would not allow an eavesdropper to
acquire these inputs too. This leads to the problem of secure function
computation.
In our context, we consider the following two Boolean functions:
fr : {0, 1}
k × {0, 1}k → {0, 1} with wA, wB ∈ {0, 1}
k and 0 ≤ r ≤ k :
f(wA, wB) = {
1, if X(wA, wB) ≥ r
0, otherwise
(1)
We are interested in r = ⌈k2⌉.
fX : {0, 1}
k × {0, 1}k → {0, 1}⌈log2(k)⌉ with wA, wB ∈ {0, 1}
k :
fX(wA, wB) = x, with x = X(wA, wB) written in binary. (2)
The function fX is, strictly, an ordered tuple (f
0
X , f
1
X , . . . , f
⌈log2(k)⌉−1
X ) of
⌈log2(k)⌉ 1-bit Boolean functions, where the function f
i
X computes the
ith most significant bit of x = X(wA, wB) (with i = 0 we take the most
significant bit and with i = ⌈log2(k)⌉ − 1 we take the least significant
bit). Using techniques from oblivious function computation (see [7] for a
survey on these techniques), we can prove that the computation of fr and
fX can be done with randomized protocols using O(|Cfr |) and O(|CfX |)
communication steps respectively, with Cfr and CfX being the Boolean
circuits that are employed for the computation of f and fX respectively.
Since both fr and fX are easily seen to be polynomial time computable
Boolean functions, we can construct for their computations circuits of
size polynomial in their input sizes, i.e. circuits Cfr and CfX such that
|Cfr | = O(k
c1) and |CfX | = O(k
c2), with constants c1, c2 ≥ 0. Since k
is considered a fixed constant, we conclude that we can compute fk and
fX in a constant number of rounds. The number of random bits needed
by each step of the randomized protocol is in both cases O(k) and, thus,
constant.
To sum up, the functions fr and fX can, both, be evaluated on two
k-bit inputs wA, wB held by two parties A,B using a constant number of
rounds and a constant number of uniformly random bits. In what follows,
we will assume that the communicating parties use the function f⌈k
2
⌉.
With regard to the required randomness, we assume that each of the
two parties has a true randomness source, i.e. a source of uniformly ran-
dom bits. Such a randomness source can be easily built into modern
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devices. This randomness source is necessary in order to implement the
randomized oblivious computation protocols for the computation of the
function f⌈k
2
⌉. In addition, it will be used in order to produce the ran-
domly chosen positions, are required by Step 6 of the protocol. Since each
position can range from 1 up to N (the string size), to form a position
index we need to draw ⌈log2(N)⌉ random bits. Alternatively, if we allow
the two parties to share a small (in relation to N) seed, they can produce
the random positions in synchronization and, thus, avoid sending them
over the communication channel.
4 Theoretical analysis of the protocol
In order to track the density of positions where two strings agree, we
will make use of Wormald’s theorem (see [13]) to model the probabilis-
tic evolution of the protocol described in Section 2 using a deterministic
function which stays provably close to the real evolution of the algorithm.
The statement of the theorem is in the Appendix for completeness. What
the theorem essentially states is that if we are confronted with a number
of (possibly) interrelated random variables (associated with some random
process) such that they satisfy a Lipschitz condition and their expected
fluctuation at each time step is known, then the value of these variables
can be approximated using the solution of a system of differential equa-
tions. Furthermore, the system of differential equations results directly
from the expressions for the expected fluctuation of the random variables
describing the random process.
We will first prove a general lemma that gives the probability of in-
creasing the similarity between two strings through flipping, at random,
the contents of a certain number of positions.
Lemma 1. Let w1, w2 be two strings of 0s and 1s of length k. Let also j,
0 ≤ j ≤ k, be the number of places in which the two strings differ. Then
if l positions of one string are randomly flipped, the probability that s of
them are differing positions is the following:
Pk,j,l,s =
(
j
s
)(
k−j
l−s
)
(k
l
) . (3)
Proof In Equation (3) the denominator is the number of all subsets of
positions of cardinality l of the k string positions while the numerator is
equal to the number of partitions of the l chosen positions such that s of
them fall into the j differing positions and the remaining l − s fall into
the remaining k− j non-differing positions of the two strings. Thus their
ratio gives the desired probability. 
The following lemma, which is easy to prove based on general prop-
erties of the binomial coefficients, provides a closed form expression for a
sum that will appear later in some probability computations.
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Lemma 2. The following identity holds:
l∑
s=0
(2s − l)
(
j
s
)(
k−j
l−s
)
(k
l
) =
(
2j
k
− 1
)
l. (4)
We will now derive the deterministic differential equation that governs
the evolution of the random variable X(i) manipulated by the protocol
in Section 2 using Wormald’s theorem.
Theorem 1. The differential equation that results from the application of
Wormald’s theorem on the quantity X(i) (places of agreement at protocol
step i) as it evolves in the agreement protocol is the following:
E[X(i + 1)−X(i)] =
k∑
j=⌈k
2
⌉
l∑
s=0
[(s− (l − s))Pk,j,l,s]Pn,n−X(i),k,j. (5)
Proof We will determine the possible values of the difference X(i+1)−
X(i) along with the probability of occurrence for each of them.
The protocol described in Section 2 flips l positions within the k ex-
amined positions, whenever these k positions contain j ≥ ⌈k2⌉ differing
positions in the two strings. From the flipped l positions, is s of them
(0 ≤ s ≤ l) are disagreement positions, then the two strings will have
gained s agreement positions, losing l−s. The net total is s− (l−s). The
probability that this total occurs, for a specific value of s and a specific
value of j is equal to Pk,j,l,sPn,n−X(i),k,j. Summing up over all possible
values of s, j we obtain (5). 
Corollary 1. The following holds:
E[X(i+ 1)−X(i)]
=
k∑
j=⌈k
2
⌉
l
(
2j
k
− 1
) (n−X(i)
j
)(X(i)
k−j
)
(n
k
) . (6)
Proof Equation (6) follows from (5) using Equation (3) of Lemma 1 with
k = n, l = k, s = j, n − j = X(i), in conjunction with Lemma 2.
Corollary 2. Using Wormald’s Theorem (Theorem 3), the evolution of
the random variable X(i) whose mean fluctuation is given in (6) can be
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approximated by the following differential equation:
dx(t)
dt
=
k∑
j=⌈k
2
⌉
l
(
2j
k
− 1
)(
k
j
)
[1− x(t)]jx(t)k−j. (7)
Proof By applying the approximation
(
N
k
)
=
Nk
k!
(
1 +O
(
1
N
))
of the binomial coefficients which is valid for k = O(1) on the three
binomials which appear on the the right-hand side of (6), we obtain the
following:
(n−X(i)
j
)(X(i)
k−j
)
(n
k
) ≃
(
k
j
)(
1−
X(i)
n
)j (X(i)
n
)k−j
.
Using Wormald’s theorem, we make the correspondence x(t) = X(i)n and
dx(t)
dt = E[X(i + 1) − X(i)], which results in the required differential
equation (7). 
5 Efficiency of the protocol
From Equation (7) we see that the percentage of similar positions, rep-
resented by the function x(t), is a monotone increasing function since its
first derivative is always positive. In what follows, we will estimate how
fast this percentage increases depending on its initial value x(0) as well
as the parameters l and k.
Lemma 3. The solution x(t) to the differential equation given in (7) is
monotone increasing.
Proof From the differential equation, we see that the first derivative of
the function x(t), which is equal to the right-hand side of the differential
equation, is strictly positive, since 0 < x(t) < 1. Thus, the function x(t)
is monotone increasing. 
Lemma 4. Let x(t1) be the value of the function x(t) at time instance t1
and x(t2) be the value at time instance t2, t1 < t2. Let, also, c(t1) be the
absolute value of the point at which the tangent line to the point (t1, x(t1))
of x(t1) cuts the t-axis and c(t2) the corresponding value for t2. Let, also,
p(x) =
k∑
j=⌈k
2
⌉
l
(
2j
k
− 1
)(
k
j
)
(1− x)jxk−j. (8)
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Then
p(x(t1)) =
x(t1)
c(t1) + t1
, p(x(t2)) =
x(t2)
c(t2) + t2
. (9)
Proof Let ǫ1 and ǫ2 be the two tangent lines to the function x(t) at the
points (t1, x(t1)) and (t2, x(t2)) respectively, as shown in Figure 1. Due
to the monotonicity of x(t), the points at which the two lines intersect
with the t-axis are negative. Let c(t1) and c(t2) be the absolute values
of these two points for lines ǫ1 and ǫ2 respectively. Then from the two
1t  2t  
( )2tx
( )1tx
( )1tc  ( )2tc  
1ε  2
ε  
0x  
2φ 1φ
 
Fig. 1. The two tangent lines for the proof of the Theorem
right angle triangles that are formed we have tan(φ1) =
x(t1)
c(t1)+t1
and
tan(φ2) =
x(t2)
c(t2)+t2
. From the definition of the derivative, tan(φ1) =
dx(t)
dt |t1
and tan(φ2) =
dx(t)
dt |t2 . From (7) and (8), we have
dx(t)
dt = p(x(t)) and,
thus, the statement of the lemma follows. 
Theorem 2. Let t′ be the time instance at which x(t′) = hx(0), with
1 ≤ h ≤ 1x(0) . Then
t2 ≤
x(0)
p(hx(0))
· (h− 1). (10)
ProofWe set t1 = 0, t2 = t
′ and x(t′) = hx(0) in Lemma 4 and we obtain,
from Equations (9) the following:
p(x(0)) =
x(0)
c(0)
, p(hx(0)) =
hx(0)
c(t′) + t′
.
From these equations we obtain the following:
p(x(0))
p(hx(0))
=
c(t′) + t′
hc(0)
.
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Solving for t′ we obtain the following:
t′ =
hp(x(0))c(0)
p(hx(0))
− c(t′). (11)
Since p(x(0)) is the inclination of the tangent line to x(t) at the point
(0, x(0)), it holds that p(x(0)) = x(0)c(0) . Thus, (11) becomes
t′ =
hx(0)
p(hx(0))
− c(t′). (12)
Since x(t) is monotone increasing, the point at which the tangent to
this function cuts the x(t)-axis at any point is greater than or equal to
x(0) (see Figure 1). Let xc be this point. Then p(x(t
′)) = xcc(t′) or, since
x(t′) = hx(0), p(hx(0)) = xcc(t′) . Since xc ≥ x(0), c(t
′) ≥ x(0)p(hx(0)) . Thus,
from (12), we obtain
t′ ≤
hx(0)
p(hx(0))
−
x(0)
p(hx(0))
=
x(0)
p(hx(0))
· (h− 1)
which is the required. 
Lemma 5. The following lower bounds hold for the polynomial in (8):
If x < 1/2 then
p(x) ≥ l[xk + 1− 2x]. (13)
If x ≥ 1/2 then
p(x) ≥
l
k
(1− x)k
(
k
⌈k2⌉
)
⌈
k
2
⌉. (14)
Proof In (8), allowing the sum index to cover all the range from 1 to k
reduces the value of the sum since it adds negative terms. Thus
p(x) ≥ l
k∑
j=1
(
2j
k
− 1
)(
k
j
)
(1− x)jxk−j.
Since the sum evaluates to l[xk+1−2x] the first statement of the lemma
follows.
If, on the other hand, x ≥ 1/2, then lower bound given for the first
statement of the lemma is not good since it may even become negative.
In this case we observe that the term (1−x)jxk−j is minimized for j = k.
Setting j = k in (8) we obtain the second statement of the lemma. 
Corollary 3. The following bounds hold for the time instance t′:
If hx(0) < 1/2 then
t′ ≤
x(0)(h − 1)
l[hx(0))k + 1− 2hx(0)]
. (15)
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If hx(0) ≥ 1/2 then
t′ ≤
kx(0)(h − 1)
l[1− hx(0)]k
( k
⌈k
2
⌉
)
⌈k2⌉
. (16)
From (15) we see that the percentage of similarities grows fast, if we start
from x(0) aiming at hx(0), with h ≥ 1 and hx(0) < 1/2 (and (15) is
only a very coarse upper bound). If the target is, however, at hx(0) with
x ≥ 1/2 the upper bound is not good as the denominator tends to 0 fast.
However, since this denominator is simply the first derivative of x(t) at
hx(0), this derivative fast tends to 0 if hx(0) ≥ 1/2 and, thus, the tangent
at this point tends to become parallel to the t-axis. Thus, we have again
fast convergence.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we described a series of protocols that can be used in or-
der to increase the percentage of similarities between two strings held by
two communicating parties without revealing their values. The protocols
involve the examination of random position subsets of size k and the flip-
ping of a randomly chosen subset of these positions if the two strings
are found to disagree in more than half the positions. In this way, the
random process governing the protocol is directed towards flipping dis-
agreement positions more than the flipping of agreement positions. The
propose protocols are, in fact, general and may be used in any situa-
tion involving either wireless or conventional networks in which there is
no trusted third party or key management authority among the network
nodes.
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APPENDIX
Approximating stochastic processes with deterministic
functions: Wormald’s Theorem [13]
Definition 1. A function f satisfies a Lipschitz condition on D ⊂ ℜj if
there exists some constant L > 0 such that
|f(u1, . . . , uj)− f(v1, . . . , vj)| ≤ L
j∑
i=1
|ui − vi|
for all (u1, . . . , uj) and (v1, . . . , vj) in D.
Definition 2. Given a random variable X depending on n, denoted by
X(n), we say that X(n) = o(f(n)) always if
max{x|Pr[X(n) = x] 6= 0} = o(f(n)).
Theorem 3. Let Y
(n)
i (t), n ≥ 1, be a sequence of real-valued random
variables, 1 ≤ i ≤ k for some fixed k, such that for all i, all t and
all n, |Y
(n)
i (t)| ≤ Bn (n > 0) for some constant B. Let H(t) be the
history of the sequence, i.e. the matrix 〈
−→
Y (0), . . . ,
−→
Y (t)〉, where
−→
Y (t) =
(Y
(n)
1 (t), . . . , Y
(n)
k (t)).
Let I = {(y1, . . . , yk) : Pr[
−→
Y (0) = (y1n, . . . , ykn)] 6= 0 for some n}.
Let D be some bounded connected open set containing the intersection
of {(s, y1, . . . , yk) : s ≥ 0} with a neighborhood of {(t/n, y1, . . . , yk) :
(y1, . . . , yk) ∈ I}. (That is, after taking a ball around the set I, D is
required to contain the part of the ball in the half-space corresponding to
s = t/n, s ≥ 0.)
Let fi : ℜ
k+1 → ℜ, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and suppose that for some m = m(n),
(i) for all i and uniformly over all t < m, always
E[Y
(n)
i (t+ 1)− Y
(n)
i (t)|H(t)]
= fi(t/n, Y
(n)
0 (t)/n, . . . , Y
(n)
k (t)/n) + o(1),
(ii) for all i and uniformly over all t < m,
Pr[|Y
(n)
i (t+ 1)− Y
(n)
i (t)| > n
1/5] = o(n−3), always,
(iii) for each i, the function fi is continuous and satisfies a Lipschitz con-
dition on D.
Then
(a) for (0, zˆ(0), . . . , zˆ(k)) ∈ D the system of differential equations
dzi
ds
= fi(s, z0, . . . , zk), 1 ≤ i ≤ k
has a unique solution in D for zi : ℜ → ℜ passing through zi(0) =
zˆ(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and which extends to points arbitrarily close to the
boundary of D;
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(b) almost surely Y
(n)
i (t) = zi(t/n) · n + o(n), uniformly for 0 ≤ t ≤
min{σ,m} and for each i, where zi(s) is the solution in (a) with zˆ
(i) =
Y
(n)
i (0)/n, and σ = σ(n) is the supremum of those s to which the
solution can be extended.
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